NOW BATTING FOR AMERICA: THE OCC

"The lending system has run amok and real people are going to get hurt."[1] That was said, in an unguarded moment, by the lead author of BusinessWeek’s current cover story [3] on the human impact of toxic mortgages. She has evidently spent months with industry insiders, and these people aren’t just concerned, they’re emotional.

This episode will look at what people are saying now, and what smart people were saying months or years ago, about the "suicide loans" that proliferated during the great Millenium housing bubble. As well, we’ll be looking at what they plan to do about them. When the vital interests of U.S. borrowers are threatened, the go-to guys are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). All signs now point to them being ready to rock and roll on toxics. Here’s hoping the rest of the Administration and Congress stands aside and lets them do their thing.

It goes without saying that the bubblehead community has been warning on suicide loans for years. However, as it became obvious to anyone willing to look that the bubble was about to peak, economic and central banking interests began to take note. An example is this extract from a March 2006 report [2] for the Bank for International Settlements written by analyst Allen Frankel. Notice the typically mild way he points out the problem. It’s a bit like the Australian tour guide quietly informing the foreign tourist that the reptile he is approaching might possibly be less harmless than it appears.

"There are signs that the US housing market is cooling. As house price appreciation slows, mortgage defaults become more likely and, at the same time, voluntary prepayments become less likely. To the extent that some investors may have failed to recognise the degree of sensitivity of their MBS investments to housing market developments, they may be exposed to losses in excess of what they had anticipated."

 

Here at Doom we were lucky enough to capture some of the moment, on Tuesday night, August 15, when the mainstream media suddenly "got it" about the bubble bursting and house prices going down. BusinessWeek seems to have been ahead of the curve on this, though, as it’s now obvious that they had long been working on a major article exploring how the burst was going to effect toxics. Last Friday they released a comprehensive cover story [3] investigating serious problems with certain classes of these exotic mortgages.

"Banks that hold lots of option ARMs on their books will surely be hit by loan defaults in coming years. ‘It’s certainly reasonable to expect to see some excesses wrung out,’ says Brad A. Morrice, president and CEO of New Century Financial Corp. But even here the damage will likely be limited. Banks use insurance [4] and other financial instruments to protect their portfolios, and they hold real assets — homes — as collateral.

Most of the pain will be born by ordinary people. And it’s already happening. More than a fifth of option ARM loans in 2004 and 2005 are upside down — meaning borrowers’ homes are worth less than their debt. If home prices fall 10%, that number would double. ‘The number of houses for sale is tripling in some markets, so people are not going to get out of their debt,’ says the Ford Foundation’s McCarthy. ‘A lot are going to walk.’

Public policy has yet to catch up with the new complexities of the lending industry. Comptroller of the Currency John C. Dugan, the banking industry’s main regulator, wants banks to clean up their act. A source inside the federal Office of the Comptroller says Dugan intends to raise lending standards, as he did last year on credit cards, where super-low minimum payments made it improbable that cardholders would ever pay down debts. New guidelines are expected this fall."

 

Lead author Mara Der Hovanesian, who I quoted at the head of this piece, expanded on the story during a revealingly candid 19 minute long podcast.[5] I have transcribed the following passage that occurred at time 07:55 – 08:33 on the MP3 version.

"We don’t know exactly what [option-ARM mortgage loans] they [the lenders] have on the books because they haven’t been required to disclose it. Now that is slowly changing. We’re getting little glimpses now because the regulator is mad. And they’re looking at their audits, and they’ve seen and they’ve talked to the banks and they’ve said, ‘you know, you have to get this stuff off your books, you’ve got to raise your standards and things have got to change.’ And so we’re expecting, in fact, new guidelines from the banking industry’s main watchdog, the Office of the Controller of the Currency, to come out with something."

 

Much of the OCC’s strategy appears to revolve around telling the lenders something like "we won’t tell you what to try, but you’d better know just what you’re doing." This would serve to make the lenders specifically responsible for the results of their actions. Supporting this idea is the output of a recent OCC sponsored study. DSNews summarized [6] the results in part as follows.

"A recent study by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency examined the role of predatory lending practices in the increase among subprime mortgage foreclosures and found that tightened underwriting framework is a better way to curb foreclosures than restricting certain lending practices."

The abstract from the study itself [7] seems to support this assessment.

"Policies that encourage subprime lenders to review and tighten loan underwriting and pricing procedures to ensure that borrowers’ abilities to repay their loans are fully reflected in lending decisions and terms may be more effective than prohibitions on specific lending practices. This approach is consistent with the approach taken in the recently proposed Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products, which emphasizes prudent loan terms and underwriting standards rather than restricting particular loan features."

 

Dugan’s "Number 2" at OCC is Ms. Julie L. Williams. A year and a half ago she delivered a remarkable speech [8] to an audience of loan officers. Half a dozen passages of this text deserve to be written in letters of fire, and I heartily recommend you read the whole thing. But for now I’ll just quote two paragraphs. The first summarizes the problem, and the second sketches the solution. Although she is actually addressing more the credit card industry (which the OCC cleaned up last year), the lessons are for the most part directly applicable to mortgages. Remember this was written in March of 2005, when the bubble was still going full blast.

"The practices associated with the new philosophy of retail lending – higher credit limits and loan-to-values, lower minimum payments, more revolving debt, less documentation and verification, and lengthening amortizations – have certainly introduced risk elements not previously present in the banking system. Combine those elements with current macroeconomic trends, including high levels of consumer leverage, sluggish job and wage growth, and a rising interest rate environment, and all signs point to considerably more credit risk embedded in the retail loan portfolios of banks than the current performance measures would indicate.

What that entails is zeroing in on those particular loans that have the highest probability of default. It means identifying particularly risky borrowers: those with unusually high debt levels and utilization of their credit card lines, and declining credit scores. It means singling out high LTV loans, loans with extensions, renewals, and rewrites; and loans in work-out programs. It means testing transactions to ensure compliance with policies and procedures. It means evaluating whether collection practices are effective, loan reserves are appropriate, and losses are recognized in a timely manner. And it means doing this consistently, constantly."

I for one would very much like to hear Ms. Williams’ thoughts today on option-ARMs.

 


Notes and References

[1]: The sentence is recorded at time 12:10 – 12:18 of [5].

[2]: "Prime or not so prime? An exploration of US housing finance in the new century" (PDF), by Allen Frankel, BIS Quarterly Review, March 2006, pp 67-78. The emphasis in all the quotes is mine. I am indebted to commenter "MaxedOutMama" in the Piggington discussion 60 Days to Tighter Lending? for the link to this paper.

[3]: "Nightmare Mortgages – They promise the American Dream: A home of your own — with ultra-low rates and payments anyone can afford. Now, the trap has sprung", Cover Story, lead author Mara Der Hovanesian, BusinessWeek, posted September 1, 2006, September 11, 2006 edition.

[4]: In an August 22nd post I pointed out that the private mortgage insurance group the Mortgage Industry Companies of America (MICA) was seriously worried about the prospect of holding the bag for these losses, and was frantically asking for help from the regulators.

[5]: "Is Your Mortgage Toxic? Deceptive loans. Phantom profits. And coming soon: A wave of defaults", Podcast, interview with Mara Der Hovanesian, BusinessWeek, released September 1, 2006.

[6]: "OCC: Stringent Lending Best Defense Against Subprime Foreclosures", by Kristin Campbell, DSNews – Default Servicing Online, September 1, 2006.

[7]: Morgan Rose, "Foreclosures of Subprime Mortgages in Chicago: Analyzing the Role of Predatory Lending Practices," Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Economics Working Paper 2006-1, August 2006.

[8]: "Remarks" (PDF), by Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Before the BAI National Loan Review Conference, New Orleans, LA, March 21, 2005.