A friend forwarded me a copy of a report "The Bell Curve of Doom?  - The Case - Shiller Price Index."  I thought the following paragraph from this report did a great job of putting price declines in perspective:

According to the Case-Shiller Composite 20 (metro areas) index, the price of an existing home peaked in July 2006. From the July 2006 peak through January 2008, the price of a representative home has fallen 12.5%. To put this in perspective, if someone had purchased an existing home in July 2006 for $1 million with a downpayment of $125 thousand (12.5% of the purchase price), that someone’s equity in the house as of January 2008 would be approximately zero. Unless there was a radical reversal in the direction of home price changes in February, that July 2006 home purchaser was upside down – i.e., had negative equity in his or her home. The Case-Shiller home price index represents a bell curve of doom for recent home purchasers and home lenders.

Note, you don’t have to be a hoodwinked, no equity down subprime borrower to be in trouble.  All that has to happen for a borrower to be in trouble is to have purchased a home at the wrong time and paid more than historic fundamentals warranted. Why does this make a difference? Look at this claim from a recent Businessweek article:

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services believes that the bulk of the writedowns of subprime securities may be behind the banks and brokers that have already announced their results for full-year 2007. There may be some additional marks to market as market indicators have shown deterioration in the first quarter. However, when we dissect the percentage of writedowns taken against various types of exposures, in our opinion the magnitude of some writedowns is greater than any reasonable estimate of ultimate losses.

 

According to Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, subprime first-lien mortgages only account for about 14% of of first-lien mortgages.  Clearly though, writedowns will not be limited to subprime mortgages- not with so many prime borrowers upside down.