"Central banks were the main source of financing for the US deficit all along." [1]

We have quietly achieved another historic milestone in this story.  To put it starkly, the blue line in Chart 1 of Brad Setser’s Oct 16th blog post has just plunged below the x-axis for the very first time.


UPDATE: Twist is on the job working her chart magic.  Here’s Doom’s first cut at what Setser’s chart extended to the present now looks like.  Note that twist is using Doom-standard yellow for treasuries and red for agencies.  The long-term back-and-forth between the two types of paper as the dominant contributor to cenbank buying becomes obvious.  Also, the historic collapse of the Agency Debt purchasing helps to explain why Paulson has suddenly developed an insatiable appetite for GSE paper, when just months ago the very idea was unspeakable.  Will that treasuries bottle-rocket trend stabilize instead of collapsing like it did around 2004/2005?  Stay tuned for the next exciting episode of our historical financial crisis.


According to The NY Fed’s weekly figures on net foreign central bank holdings (as compiled by Housing Doom) of Agency debt going back to February 9, 2000, this is the first time on record that the cenbanks have ever collectively had a net sell-off of agencies over a 52 week period.

Agency Debt holdings as of December 26, 2007: $831.694 billion

Agency Debt holdings as of December 25, 2008: $818.992 billion

Net central bank purchase of Agency Debt (52 weeks): -12.702 billion

Because there had been a mild sell-off of agencies between Dec 26, 2007 and Jan 2, 2008, the estimated sell-off of Agency Debt for the calendar year 2008 to now is a bit lower than that, about -$11.398 billion.

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[1]: "The collapse of financial globalization …", by Brad Setser, Council on Foreign Relations, December 29, 2008.

At this point, I don’t really think that there can be much doubt that the enormous increase in central bank reserves over the last five years was central to the process that allowed the US to run large current account deficits during a period when private demand — that is private inflows net of private outflows — for US financial assets wasn’t there. At least not on the scale needed to finance the United States big deficits.

In my judgment, the US housing bubble — and the associated rise in private consumption as households borrowed against the rising value of their home — wouldn’t have been able to grow for as long as it did without this inflow from the rest of the world. … [I would interpret this as supporting my old contention that cenbank MBS purchases have been financing the war; e.g. on May 12, 2007 I wrote: "It’s easy to see that, among other things, central bank appetite (mostly East Asian) for F&F’s conforming mortgage paper has been underwriting the Iraq and Afghanistan wars since mid-April."]