That raises the question of whether at some point the administration might abandon the remaining ambiguity about their status and declare that it stands full-square behind [Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's] debts. [1]

What we are seeing now is a huge dilemma for Treasury. As soon as they say that the government guarantee on GSE Agency Debt, the senior bonds issued by enterprises like already semi-nationalized Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, is "explicit" then the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will have to acknowledge the US National Debt is about twice as big [2] as the present official figure. Read the story the above quote came from [1] closely and you will note a sort of mathematical limit — spokespeople are approaching the precipice arbitrarily closely, but never actually cross.

Pressure on Agency Debt is steadily building. Al Yoon is reporting both that conforming mortgages at the heart of the GSEs’ book of business are facing the threat of ratings downgrades [3] and that the GSEs may have to buy even dodgier legacy paper from private sector mortgage originators [4] so that Obama’s housing bailout can work. That bailout not only doubled Treasury’s direct support of Fannie & Freddie to $400 billion, but as Doom noted Wednesday it was reported [5] that "the plan extended the government’s line of credit with the GSE’s and enabled Treasury to take an equity stake in the firms." All this comfort may not be enough, however. There are increasing signs [6] that the foreign buyers of agencies are demanding that the government guarantee on these bonds be made explicit.

Agency Debt really started teetering on the brink of becoming a sovereign obligation of the United States on October 23, 2008 when then (and presently serving) FHFA Director and Bush protege Jim Lockhart testified to Congress that in the wake of their being seized into FHFA conservatorship Fannie & Freddie enjoyed an explicit government guarantee on their senior debt. In the frantic and confused retreat from that statement the formerly "implicit" guaranty on agencies was rebranded as "effective," and it has remained the unofficial policy of the government, extending to the new administration, that the guarantee will become "more and more effective" to appease investors’ fears, but will never again threaten to tip over into "explicit."

That has the effect of drawing a bright line firmly under treasuries. Agencies remain definitively junior to America’s real sovereign obligations, so in the unlikely event that Uncle Sam is forced by circumstances to administer a haircut on government supported paper, imposing a loss on Agency Debt holders would not (quite) imply breaking faith. In the past I’ve termed this remote possibility Sovereign Default Lite. But on the other hand as the effective guarantee approaches explicit as a limit, there is the risk it may someday accidentally stray into explicitness. The mind boggles imagining how the models at Moody’s, S&P and Fitch could be tweaked to preserve America’s AAA debt rating if the amount of that debt were to suddenly double.

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Notes and References

[1]: "Grip tightened on Fannie and Freddie", by Krishna Guha and Saskia Scholtes, Financial Times, February 20, 2009.

[2]: "Fannie, Freddie and the Ballooning U.S. Balance Sheet", by Tom Lindmark, Seeking Alpha, February 21, 2009.

Now you can see the extent of the problem. An explicit guarantee is going to bring the two on balance sheet, which would more or less double the reported debt of the country. That may only be a recognition of reality, but it does have consequences. …

[3]: "Mortgage "AAA" bond downgrades could double – Citi", by Al Yoon, Reuters, February 20, 2009.

[4]: "US mortgage plan hikes bond investor risk – Amherst", by Al Yoon, February 20, 2009.

[5]: "Treasury Boosts Funds For Fannie,Freddie To $200 Billion Each", by Maya Jackson Randall and Jeff Bater, February 18, 2009.

[6]: "Asian Investors Hold Out for Explicit Guarantee on GSEs", by Paul Jackson, Housing Wire, February 20, 2009.