Doom’s collection of transcripts of AEI seminars now features a date-order list of our transcripts and the same list in the context of close to a hundred further events that throw light on some aspect of the subprime crisis, housing bubble or credit crunch while offering an audio and/or video record. These all now have designation codes in case we want to create transcripts of some of them in future.
This made it necessary to change the designations on a couple of our existing transcripts. So a lot of the links in the participants and questioners sections needed to be moved around and fixed.
The under-construction transcript VI.B has now been re-designated VI.C.
Of the nine completed Doom AEI subprime transcripts one, III.A, has been re-designated IV.C.
Doom regrets any inconvenience this may have caused to our readers.
1:36:34… This crisis was caused by massive government subsidies to purchase homes by people who couldn’t really afford them. So what does Congress do? They pass an $8,000 tax credit for people who can’t really afford to buy a home to buy one. I mean, how stupid can you get? - John Makin
Housing Doom is pleased to present a complete unauthorized annotated transcript for the American Enterprise Institute’s October 22, 2009 event "The Deflating Bubble, Part VI: The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis".1 The event site has a variety of resources including both an audio and a video of the proceedings. There is as yet no official transcript.
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Alex Pollock:[0:00:00] Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. [slide2 1]
When in the course of financial events we have a huge bubble and the inevitable succeeding huge bust, a decent respect for the the opinions of mankind requires that we try to learn something useful from the painful experience. That’s the point of these deflating bubble series of AEI conferences, which you all have so kindly supported with your participation. So welcome to Deflating Bubble Roman numeral VI, "The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis."
Almost 19 months later, Doomers may enjoy putting some of these opinions up against what actually took place.
Housing Doom is pleased to present a complete unauthorized annotated transcript for the American Enterprise Institute’s April 28, 2008 event "What Lies Beyond the Credit Crunch? Part II".1 The event site has a variety of resources including a summary and both an audio and a video of the proceedings. There is an official transcript, but the link to it does not seem to be currently working.
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Peter Wallison:[0:00:00] OK, I think we’ll get started. Everyone take his or her seat. I want to welcome you all on a pretty raining and nasty day. I’m delighted that all of you came out. This should be one of the more interesting conferences of the year, and I can understand why you’re all here.
This is the 2nd conference on exactly the same subject. The last time these esteemed AEI economists got together to discuss the future of the credit crunch and the US economy was in December of 2007. At that conference there was sharp disagreement at to whether the US, as a result of that housing meltdown, the credit crunch and other factors was headed for a deep recession, a shallow recession, or merely a slowdown for a quarter or two.
The data presented at that conference showed a serious breakdown in trading in the credit markets, and major losses in housing values. These factors would suggest a serious recession. But at that point there was no clear evidence of a recession, during the 4th quarter of 2007, at least. The Dow, which opened at 13,339 that morning, was down from its high of 14,000, but certainly was not signaling a serious recession.
All the participants in the December conference thought that their predictions would be proved correct when several months of additional data was available, so we scheduled this conference to see [laughs] whether in fact their positions have changed, and whether things have become any clearer to our AEI economists.
Well I think at some point we’re going to have a government in power that’s going to make a choice between the American people and our creditors, who are predominantly foreign. And I think that choice will involve letting the dollar depreciate. I don’t think we’ll ever actually repudiate our debts, as long as we can print more dollars. But I think that’s the fundamental political issue that faces our entire society … - Chris Whalen
Housing Doom is pleased to present a eighth and final selection from our under-construction transcript of the American Enterprise Institute’s October 22, 2009 event "The Deflating Bubble, Part VI: The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis".1
The event site has a number of resources, including an audio and video of the proceedings. There is as yet no official transcript.
The lively Question and Answer session that closed the conference featured everything from Roubini’s lurid medium term scenarios to Zimmernan’s surprising advice that Re-remics, along with just about any other recent real estate securitizations, are perfectly safe to buy.
Alex Pollock:[1:31:26] Let me come to our questions. We’re going to, we have microphones, a microphone in the back. Please remember how this works. Wait for the microphone, please tell us your name and your affiliation, and then ask your question. For those of you who may feel the urge to make an assertion in addition to your question, may I ask you to keep your assertion short and to the point, otherwise I’ll feel compelled to ask you to come to your question. … I have a hand way in the back, here. … Oh, it’s Bert [laughs] …
Bert Ely: I was hiding on you, Alex. Bert Ely, banking consultant. A suggestion and a question. In terms of describing the kind of recovery you have, let me offer another suggestion to you that I’ve been using. I call it a washboard recovery. Slow and very bumpy over the next few years.
So, you know, there’s nothing for safety and soundness like a comfortable oligopoly. We might think about that and … we’re planning, for those of you who are interested, a conference, coming up in a few months, contrasting the Canadian house finance and financial system with the American system. So there’s a little advert — little preview.
Housing Doom is pleased to present a seventh selection from our under-construction transcript of the American Enterprise Institute’s October 22, 2009 event "The Deflating Bubble, Part VI: The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis".1
The event site has a number of resources, including an audio and video of the proceedings. There is as yet no official transcript.
Most of AEI’s "team bear" participated in a brief but lively discussion after the presentations.
Alex Pollock:[1:21:56] Thank-you, Desmond. Having heard five really interesting presentations, let me give the panelists, if they want, a chance to add something, or react to the others. Nouriel?
Nouriel Roubini: Just a comment on the last point that Desmond made. In this crisis, regulated banks got in trouble, but also a lot of non-regulated financial institutions — were broker/dealers like Bear and when bust. And so in some sense, suppose we go back to Glass-Steagall and not against it? What does it rule out? And then you’re going to have a bunch of broker/dealers or non-bank Shadow Banks that are going to become too big to fail. They’re going to do crazy things and eventually we’ll have to bail them out.
So do we need to really go back to Glass-Steagall? Or we need to break up every financial institution and make it so small that it can fail and who cares? And we don’t have to bail them out. What’s the appropriate policy choice on that? And I think that’s an open question for everybody else on the panel.
Housing Doom is pleased to present a sixth selection from our under-construction transcript of the American Enterprise Institute’s October 22, 2009 event "The Deflating Bubble, Part VI: The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis".1
The event site has a number of resources, including an audio and video of the proceedings. There is as yet no official transcript.
This is the presentation by AEI’s Desmond Lachman.
Desmond Lachman:[1:08:20] Alex, thank-you very much again for organizing this conference at a 6-monthly interval.
I think one’s got to go through life counting one’s blessings, and one of the blessings that I’ve realized that I’ve got to count on now is that my name isn’t Tom Zimmerman, and that I come at the end of the presentation.
Because much of what is said, I really agree with. So I can walk through a presentation. I’ve entitled it "A False Dawn for the Housing Market?" [slide 12]
In the interests of being optimistic I’ve put a question mark whereas I really meant putting an exclamation mark. [laughter]
Let me start just with the lessons that one can draw from this crisis, and I think that there are a whole bunch of lessons. We’re going to be writing books about this for many years to come, much like The Great Depression we’ll be looking through this crisis. And I very much agree with what both Nouriel and John have said, that one really needs to be paying attention to bubbles, that we’re just creating another bubble that is going to be bursting. But I think that there are just a whole bunch of other lessons to be learned.
I think almost by definition we’re … I mean I would say W, because I think in the US anyway we’ll still see a 3 1/2 percent growth number in the 3rd quarter, which will be reported next week, and maybe a 3 percent number in the 4th quarter …
Housing Doom is pleased to present a fifth selection from our under-construction transcript of the American Enterprise Institute’s October 22, 2009 event "The Deflating Bubble, Part VI: The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis".2
The event site has a number of resources, including an audio and video of the proceedings. There is as yet no official transcript.
This is the presentation by AEI Visiting Scholar John Makin
John Makin:[0:54:19] So I’m going to say that so far what we’ve heard is, it’s the lessons of the — having deflated and about to reflate bubble. And that’s a little different than the idea that the bubbles burst and it’s past us.
But, you know, I’ve taken the charge here quite literally — What are the lessons of the bubble? And I think we’ve heard that it may not be the only bubble that we’re getting, but I … The main lesson of the bubble in the US in a sentence is "You’ve got to be Too Big to Fail," because then you get bailed out.
Final risk. The increasing asset prices we’ve seen since March for everything: global equities; in US, equities; EM [emerging market] asset classes; commodity; credit; everything around the world is driven by one factor.
The penultimate risk was merely the prospect of World War III breaking out. Fortunately Nouriel was running overtime so Alex had to cut him short just before he got to the scary bit
UPDATE (11/6): Here’s Nouriel’s Nov 4th expansion on the idea
Housing Doom is pleased to present a fourth selection from our under-construction transcript of the American Enterprise Institute’s October 22, 2009 event "The Deflating Bubble, Part VI: The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis".1
The event site has a number of resources, including an audio and video of the proceedings. There is as yet no official transcript.
Dr. Doom was batting cleanup …
Nouriel Roubini:[0:37:03] OK. Tom spoke about housing and mortgages. What Chris spoke about — the banks. So I’ll try to speak about the economy and what’s going to happen to the economy looking ahead.
We’ve had the most severe recession and financial crisis since the Great Depression. Given the monetary and fiscal stimulus and the backstopping of the financial system now we’re close to the bottom, at least on a temporary basis.
And now the debate is, of course, on what’s going to happen — the shape of the recovery. Given what has happened in the markets I would say the markets are pricing now a V-shaped recovery with rapid return to potential growth, and that’s even what the macro forecasters’ consensus is.
There is a second view, which is the one I share, is that this recovery is going to be at best an anaemic, subpar, below trend, with growth well below trend for the next couple of years, much as in the US, but also in advanced economies. So more like a U-shaped recovery. That’s also the view of the IMF and the one of those folks at PIMCO who are talking about A New Normal.
Housing Doom is pleased to present a third selection from our under-construction transcript of the American Enterprise Institute’s October 22, 2009 event "The Deflating Bubble, Part VI: The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis".1
The event site has a number of resources, including an audio and video of the proceedings. There is as yet no official transcript.
This is the presentation by IRA co-founder Chris Whalen. I see Nouriel on deck, but this one’s going to be a tough act to follow.
So this is what the commenters at Calculated Risk have been going on about …
Chris Whalen:[0:27:02] I’m going to talk a little bit about the industry because we’re in the middle of earnings season, and I apologize for not preparing something, but I’ve been reading bank earnings statements, so I will share some of my impressions of that. And then I want to talk a little bit about not only lessons, but some of the enduring trends that I see that have not been affected by the extensive bailout that the government has put together for our largest financial institutions.
In general, when you look at the industry you have to recall the words of Mr. Feinberg, and I don’t mean the guy who was in the newspaper today, I mean my friend Bob Feinberg in the back of the room, who predicted several years ago in an interview we published that the GSE would become the business model of choice for the United States.
Housing Doom is pleased to present a second selection from our under-construction transcript of the American Enterprise Institute’s October 22, 2009 event "The Deflating Bubble, Part VI: The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis".1
The event site has a number of resources, including an audio and video of the proceedings. There is as yet no official transcript.
This is the presentation by UBS fixed income researcher Tom Zimmerman. Tom’s the most moderate of AEI’s Six Bears but in my opinion the scariest, because he usually brings the hardest data to the table.
Tom Zimmerman:[0:11:43] Thanks a lot, Alex, it’s great to be here again. [slide 02] What’s amazing about coming down here every 6 months is that I’m usually viewed as one of the more bearish people in my shop, and also when I speak at conferences around the country I’m usually sort of sitting on the bearish side of these discussions. But I come down here, [laughs] and I’m not … it’s a … I feel like I’m a raving bull about what’s going to happen in the world when you listen to some of these people talk. So anyway, that hasn’t changed, in the last 6 sessions, so …
We had lunch together today, and it’s exactly the same.
I see some green shoots here and there, but I think that it’s not something the other panelists see some real major problems down the road.
What I thought I’d do today is just continue some of the things I’ve talked about before in terms of the housing market, mortgage market. And then at the end talk about some of the lessons that we’ve learned from this bubble which isn’t over with yet, but we’ve learned some lessons or at least some take-aways from it.
