Housing Doom

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said it’s impossible to know that you are in a bubble when you are in one.  It isn’t impossible for most of us, but it sure seems to be tough for the Fed. Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Donald Kohn who seems to have the same problem:

Kohn said it’s wise to beware of "false positives" when assessing potential asset bubbles, such as with rising stock or commodity prices. A Fed action to correct a bubble might include hiking interest rates, which could harm a wider financial recovery, he said.

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1:36:34 … This crisis was caused by massive government subsidies to purchase homes by people who couldn’t really afford them. So what does Congress do? They pass an $8,000 tax credit for people who can’t really afford to buy a home to buy one. I mean, how stupid can you get? - John Makin

Doom Transcripts: Index & Guide

Housing Doom is pleased to present a complete unauthorized annotated transcript for the American Enterprise Institute’s October 22, 2009 event "The Deflating Bubble, Part VI: The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis".¹ The event site has a variety of resources including both an audio and a video of the proceedings. There is as yet no official transcript.

Table of Contents

[link navigation works best when full article displayed]

1. 0:00:00 - Alex Pollock intro (preview post)
2. 0:11:43 - Tom Zimmerman presentation (preview post)
3. 0:26:50 - Chris Whalen presentation (preview post)
4. 0:37:03 - Nouriel Roubini presentation (preview post)
5. 0:54:19 - John Makin presentation (preview post)
6. 1:08:20 - Desmond Lachman presentation (preview post)
7. 1:21:56 - Panel discussion (preview post)
   1. 1:22:08 - Roubini discussion
   2. 1:22:59 - Whalen discussion
   3. 1:23:57 - Lachman discussion
   4. 1:25:24 - Makin discussion
   5. 1:28:01 - Whalen question
      1. 1:28:18 - Makin response
      2. 1:29:19 - Pollock response
   6. 1:29:51 - Pollock (with Roubini) aside on Canada
8. 1:31:26 - Q&A (preview post)
   1. 1:32:00 - Bert Ely question
      1. 1:33:04 - Zimmerman (with Roubini) response
      2. 1:34:29 - Whalen response
   2. 1:34:58 - Brian Gardner question
      1. 1:35:43 - Makin response
      2. 1:36:59 - Whalen response
   3. 1:38:18 - Steve Votaw question
      1. 1:38:59 - Lachman response
      2. 1:40:38 - Roubini response
      3. 1:41:22 - Zimmerman response
      4. 1:41:49 - Pollock response
   4. 1:42:11 - Jack Phelps[ph] question
      1. 1:42:54 - Makin response
      2. 1:43:24 - Whalen response
   5. 1:44:40 - John Serrapere question
      1. 1:46:02 - Roubini response
   6. 1:46:27 - anonymous question
      1. 1:47:44 - Whalen (with Pollock) response
      2. 1:48:44 - Roubini response
      3. 1:49:52 - Makin response
   7. 1:50:42 - Barry Wood question
      1. 1:51:12 - Roubini response
      2. 1:54:36 - Whalen response
   8. 1:55:02 - Christine Eisner[ph] question
      1. 1:55:24 - Zimmerman response
   9. 1:57:22 - Dale Kinsella[ph] question
      1. 1:57:55 - Makin response
   10. 1:58:44 - Pollock brief wrap-up
9. 1:59:06 (end)
   • Notes and References

Alex Pollock: [0:00:00] Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. [slide² 1]

When in the course of financial events we have a huge bubble and the inevitable succeeding huge bust, a decent respect for the the opinions of mankind requires that we try to learn something useful from the painful experience. That’s the point of these deflating bubble series of AEI conferences, which you all have so kindly supported with your participation. So welcome to Deflating Bubble Roman numeral VI, "The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis."

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1:27:42 No, might go wrong. - Allan Meltzer

Doom Transcripts: Index & Guide

Almost 19 months later, Doomers may enjoy putting some of these opinions up against what actually took place.

Housing Doom is pleased to present a complete unauthorized annotated transcript for the American Enterprise Institute’s April 28, 2008 event "What Lies Beyond the Credit Crunch? Part II".¹ The event site has a variety of resources including a summary and both an audio and a video of the proceedings. There is an official transcript, but the link to it does not seem to be currently working.

Table of Contents

[link navigation works best when full article displayed]

1. 0:00:00 - Peter Wallison Intro
2. 0:07:43 - Charles Calomiris presentation
3. 0:24:33 - Kevin Hassett presentation
4. 0:36:53 - (interruption for computer problems)
5. 0:39:20 - Desmond Lachman presentation
6. 0:55:22 - John Makin presentation
7. 1:15:02 - Allan Metzer presentation
8. 1:36:04 - Vincent Reinhart presentation
9. 1:55:20 - Panel discussion
   1. 1:55:36 - Calomiris discussion
   2. 2:00:18 - Hassett discussion
   3. 2:01:55 - Lachman discussion
   4. 2:03:41 - Makin discussion
   5. 2:06:49 - Meltzer discussion
   6. 2:10:30 - Reinhart discussion
10. 2:12:34 - Q&A
    1. 2:12:59 - Jeff Wrase question
       1. 2:13:28 - Makin response
       2. 2:13:39 - Wallison digression
          • 2:14:33 - Calomiris response
          • 2:15:47 - Lachman response
       3. 2:16:26 - Lachman response
       4. 2:17:06 - Makin (with Wallison) response
    2. 2:18:34 - Bert Ely question
       1. 2:19:21 - Calomiris response
    3. 2:20:38 - Pieter Bottelier question
       1. 2:21:11 - Meltzer response
       2. 2:23:52 - Makin response
    4. 2:25:00 - Steve Entin question
       1. 2:26:05 - Meltzer reply
       2. 2:27:39 - Lachman reply
    5. 2:28:18 Wallison brief wrap-up
11. 2:28:54 (end)
    • Notes and References

Peter Wallison: [0:00:00] OK, I think we’ll get started. Everyone take his or her seat. I want to welcome you all on a pretty raining and nasty day. I’m delighted that all of you came out. This should be one of the more interesting conferences of the year, and I can understand why you’re all here.

This is the 2nd conference on exactly the same subject. The last time these esteemed AEI economists got together to discuss the future of the credit crunch and the US economy was in December of 2007. At that conference there was sharp disagreement at to whether the US, as a result of that housing meltdown, the credit crunch and other factors was headed for a deep recession, a shallow recession, or merely a slowdown for a quarter or two.

The data presented at that conference showed a serious breakdown in trading in the credit markets, and major losses in housing values. These factors would suggest a serious recession. But at that point there was no clear evidence of a recession, during the 4th quarter of 2007, at least. The Dow, which opened at 13,339 that morning, was down from its high of 14,000, but certainly was not signaling a serious recession.

All the participants in the December conference thought that their predictions would be proved correct when several months of additional data was available, so we scheduled this conference to see [laughs] whether in fact their positions have changed, and whether things have become any clearer to our AEI economists.

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Yesterday, the U.S. Treasury released it’s Making Home Affordable Program Servicer Performance Report.  Interestingly, the report didn’t actually say how well the loan mods were performing. [Thanks L!]

Good news that more than 650,000 borrowers have been put into trial mods, no news that we have no idea how successful those mods are now five months after the program really got cooking.

It’s coming, that’s what the folks at Treasury say. 

I have a strong suspicion that if the program were meeting with any success at all, the data would have been a lot more forthcoming.

That doesn’t seem to be the only omission either.  A class action lawsuit was dismissed in Minneapolis yesterday by a group of homeowners fighting foreclosure after their loan mods were rejected.  The homeowners claim that they weren’t given proper notice,  nor were they informed that they had the right to appeal.

The judge ruled that loan modifications were not an entitlement nor were there "due process" qualifications. The attorney for the homeowners said that the Treasury was making changes however:

Treasury now requires that loan servicing companies collect data on denials, provide written notices of denials within 10 days, halt foreclosures when homeowners challenge denials and provide homeowners with some of the data that went into servicer’s decisions.

So the Treasury not only doesn’t know [or isn't saying] the performance rate of loans in the trial period, it didn’t even bother to ask lenders how many borrowers were being rejected?  How could anyone adequately assess the value of the program without knowing the percentage of successful modifications or the percentage of applicants that were even allowed into the program? Additionally you would think that a breakdown as to WHY borrowers were being rejected would be useful- especially if this data could be compared between lending institutions.

There is a scene in movie The Sound of Music where the Nazis discover the Von Trapp family attempting to escape in the middle of the night.  The officer tells Captain Von Trapp, So Captain- we have not asked you where you are going, and you have not asked us why we are here.  Captain Von Trapp responds Apparently we are both suffering from an appalling lack of curiosity.

The Treasury seems to be suffering from the same thing– an appalling lack of curiosity. Either that, or an appalling unwillingness to share what they know.

The United States Constitution Article 1, Section 8 puts Congress in charge of the national checkbook.  Legislation enacted over the years however, has created loopholes big enough to drive a semi through.  This may end up being one of the biggest ones:

The credit crunch has displayed yawning democratic deficits, like the inability of Congress to get a proper handle on the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending programs. But with Fannie and Freddie, it is the Treasury that gets to freely commit massive amounts of money. Both companies have bought most of the mortgages written in America this year and are modifying large amounts of loans to keep people in their homes.

This matters to investors. From a macroeconomic perspective, it is unhealthy when the government faces few checks when pouring billions of dollars into one sector of the economy, in this case, the housing market. The Treasury has committed up to $400 billion to keep Fannie and Freddie solvent. The two have already received or requested over $110 billion of that total.

Legislation passed last year puts no dollar limit on how much the Treasury can plow into Fannie and Freddie. Granted, Congress signed off on that bill, and the Treasury does have to explain its injections to Congress. But legislators may look back at one of the biggest blank checks they have signed.

What’s more, a possible accounting-rule change could force Fannie and Freddie to consolidate trillions of dollars of assets and liabilities early next year. Since Uncle Sam controls the companies, that would effectively balloon the government’s balance sheet.

Accounting rule changes only seem to serve as rose colored glasses anymore.  It’s hard for me to believe that an accounting rule change that would make the government’s balance sheet look worse will ever happen. 

What is far more likely than the accounting rule change is that the Treasury will continue to pour money down the dark hole of the GSEs in the name of stabilizing housing.   Someone needs to point out to Congress that the Constitution is intended to promote the GENERAL welfare, not the CORPORATE.

Well I think at some point we’re going to have a government in power that’s going to make a choice between the American people and our creditors, who are predominantly foreign. And I think that choice will involve letting the dollar depreciate. I don’t think we’ll ever actually repudiate our debts, as long as we can print more dollars. But I think that’s the fundamental political issue that faces our entire society … - Chris Whalen

Doom Transcripts: Index & Guide

Housing Doom is pleased to present a eighth and final selection from our under-construction transcript of the American Enterprise Institute’s October 22, 2009 event "The Deflating Bubble, Part VI: The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis".¹

The event site has a number of resources, including an audio and video of the proceedings. There is as yet no official transcript.

The lively Question and Answer session that closed the conference featured everything from Roubini’s lurid medium term scenarios to Zimmernan’s surprising advice that Re-remics, along with just about any other recent real estate securitizations, are perfectly safe to buy.

Alex Pollock: [1:31:26] Let me come to our questions. We’re going to, we have microphones, a microphone in the back. Please remember how this works. Wait for the microphone, please tell us your name and your affiliation, and then ask your question. For those of you who may feel the urge to make an assertion in addition to your question, may I ask you to keep your assertion short and to the point, otherwise I’ll feel compelled to ask you to come to your question. … I have a hand way in the back, here. … Oh, it’s Bert [laughs] …

Bert Ely: I was hiding on you, Alex. Bert Ely, banking consultant. A suggestion and a question. In terms of describing the kind of recovery you have, let me offer another suggestion to you that I’ve been using. I call it a washboard recovery. Slow and very bumpy over the next few years.

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To that end, FHFA has informed Fannie Mae that a possible transfer of a portion of its LIHTC investments to unrelated third-party investors is consistent with FHFA’s ongoing efforts to conserve Enterprise assets and with the Enterprise’s multifamily housing mission. … FHFA Acting Director Edward J. DeMarco, November 5, 2009¹

Many thanks to twist for data-mining that gem from the dark recesses of the DC bureaucracy. So in all the turbulence going around, the most urgent crisis facing America is …

• Swine Flu? not even in the top 10
• Recession? OVER! OVER! OVER!
• CMBS Tsunami? way out in the offing, won’t hit for weeks
• Looming Shortage of "Dow 10K" Party Hats? not even that …

America’s most urgent crisis is the fallout from October 23, 2008, when DeMarco’s predecessor Jim Lockhart testified in Congress and mentioned the word explicit.²

Once a week³ ever since, the OMB’s most consistently optimistic analyst (let’s just call him "Phineas Q. Pangloss") has come back from a long lunch, taken a deep breath, and circulated a research note to the effect that …

… Yeah sure guys, no problem. Treasury can cut off their support⁴ to the GSEs any time they want to. And holders of Agency Debt would be, like, totally cool with the resulting haircut. After all, every piece of senior debt ever issued by Freddie, Fannie and the gang came stamped with a nice big notice that "This Ain’t No Sovereign Obligation of No USA!"

And the reason this happens every week without fail is that should the OMB ever come to the same conclusion as Mr. Market (that there’s no way in Hell that Geithner’s ever going to throw the agencies holders under the bus) they would have no choice but to immediately double the nominal value of the US National Debt.

But there’s one small problem. Fannie & Freddie are being used as a couple of cudgels to beat back the housing recession, and so their balance sheets are swelling by the day with more and more toxic MBS. Profitable? Probably never as they’re situated, but if the farce of conservatorship ends and they revert to the pre-1968 world where Fannie was an actual Federal Government department like Ginnie, you trigger the above disaster.

Enter LIHTC. If Fannie requests another $15 billion (like they did yesterday) too often, even Pangloss will have to recognize the evident truth that

1. Fannie’s a basket case; and,
2. Treasury is their explicitly dependable sugar daddy.

So the GSEs and their regulator, the FHFA, are going to use every trick they can think of to keep up the pretense that the Enterprises are going concerns.

Now LIHTC is tax-reduction credits, many $billions worth, but Fannie isn’t going to have a bit of taxable income for many, many years. So to achieve a benefit for its own balance sheet, they have to find someone else with $billions of fresh profit who will buy the credits at a discount so they can reduce their taxes. Hello, Goldman⁵ and Mr. Buffett.⁶

But in real life, Fannie and the US Treasury are two pockets on the same pair of pants. The net effect of this exploit would be to give a direct government gift of billions of dollars to some of America’s most flush companies so that Fannie can put off for a couple of months formally going back to Geithner for their next infusion of cash. What’s Wrong with This Picture?

So at any rate, Doomers will I’m sure be ecstatic at the heart-warming news that response-times to aid the needy have reduced considerably since Katrina. Guy Fawkes’ fireworks have barely cooled down and already WSJ⁷ is reporting FHFA approval for selling $2.6 billion-worth of the credits to unnamed, but surely deserving counterparties. Would that FEMA could start dropping relief packages as expeditiously.

UPDATE: The plot thickens.¹¹

If you were curious about the recent news regarding Goldman Sachs’ (GS) and Warren Buffett’s (BRK.A) interest in acquiring the tax losses of Fannie Mae (FNM), the details are in Fannie’s 10-Q.

This deal was agreed to and inked a month ago. It is still pending approval. So the information that was first reported by Bloomberg was a deliberate plant. A possible objective would have been to get a decision on the transaction before yesterday’s release. Note that the Q provides an update of the deal’s status as of November 5. Someone was waiting to edit this section right up to the last minute. A tad unusual.

……………………..

Further (Friday PM late): This¹² just in from the WSJ.

The U.S. Treasury blocked Fannie Mae’s proposed sale of nearly $3 billion in low-income housing tax credits to Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. on Friday after concluding that the deal was too costly for taxpayers.
…

But Treasury Department officials blocked the deal after concluding that it would have resulted in a loss of tax revenues greater than the savings to the federal government had it allowed the sale. "In short, withholding approval of the proposed sale affords more protection of the taxpayers than does providing approval," an administration official said in a statement.
…

Approving the deal could have also furthered a perception that policy makers have taken steps that have favored Goldman ahead of other banks at a time when populist sentiment against Wall Street has surged.

But since the debt that finances things like that is still regarded as the world’s safest investment, foreign central banks are eager to buy the stuff. While The Fed’s own MBS holdings rose a trivial $0.328 billion, and the cenbanks’ agencies not much more than that, their Treasury Debt buy was more than healthy, according to this week’s Reuters report⁸. The report was, as usual, based on the weekly update from the NY Fed’s H.4.1 table site.⁹ Here is Doom’s updated CSV version¹⁰ of the agencies and treasuries foreign central bank holdings data set.

The treasuries buy was a lusty $18.159 billion, more than doubling last week’s figure.

Agencies were back in positive territory, but only added $0.758 billion.

The net change of US obligations was an excellent $18.917 billion, well over $2 billion a day.

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In the ongoing debate about whether one should walk away from an underwater mortgage or not, one University of Arizona professor speaks out strongly in favor of taking a hike. According to Brent T. White, an associate professor of law at the University of Arizona:

A failure to grasp the true economics of the situation is holding back many Americans whose home values have dropped far below the amount they owe and who would be better off renting, Mr. White says. Fear, shame and guilt also are preventing rational decisions, he believes. And, he says, those “emotional constraints” are encouraged by politicians and bankers, who ruthlessly and amorally follow their own economic interests while telling Joe Soggy Homeowner he has a moral duty to pay his debt so long as he possibly can.

I was sent the above article by Doom friend M.R., and highly recommend reading the comments section.  There are a number of intelligent comments taking up both sides of the walking debate.  The article discusses White’s paper Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis.

White says that he is not amazed by the number of folks walking away from their mortgage- he’s amazed by the number that don’t.  He repeatedly refers to walkers as "rational homeowners".  We often hear how you might as well hang on and sit tight- markets are cyclical and values will come back in a few years.  Besides, you don’t want a black mark on your credit rating.  Here’s why White refers to walkers as "rational" though:

White gives the hypothetical situation of "Sam and Chris".  Sam and Chris purchased a typical home in Salinas, CA for $585K in January 2006.  They have a monthly payment of $4,300/mo., slightly less than 31% of their income.  The couple just break even every month.

Unfortunately for Sam and Chris, the housing market began to collapse in 2007. Though they still owe about $560,000 on their home, it is now only worth $187,000. A similar house around the corner from Sam and Chris recently listed for $179,000, which, with a modest 5% down, would translate to a total monthly payment of less than $1200 per month – as compared to the $4300 that they currently pay. They could rent a similar house in the neighborhood for about $1000.

Assuming they intend to stay in their home ten years, Sam and Chris would save approximately $340,000 by walking away, including a monthly savings of at least $1700 on rent verses mortgage payments, even after factoring in the mortgage interest tax reduction. The financial gain for Sam and Chris from walking away would be even more substantial if they took their monthly savings and put it into an investment account. If they stay in their home on the other hand, it will take Sam and Chris over 60 years just to recover their equity – assuming, of course, that they live that long, the market in Salinas has indeed hit bottom, and their home appreciates at the historical appreciation rate of 3.5%.

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Fraud might be rampant in the program, but that didn’t stop the Senate from voting 85-2 in favor of extending the home buyer tax credit.  Why is it that the Senate is so willing to extend this expensive program?  Here’s an example from Savannah, GA as to how the credit is affecting the market:

The housing credit’s impact is particularly pronounced in the Savannah area.

The number of first-time buyers locally is unavailable, but pricing and loan trends indicate they could make up more than 40 percent of the market.

Homes priced under $200,000 have outsold those priced above that number by almost a 2-to-1 margin this year, with homes sold for $100,000 to $149,999 - "starter homes" - outpacing all others.

And almost half of the houses financed locally this year were done with loans backed by the Federal Housing Administration or the Veterans Administration, which cater to first-time buyers.

And how would allowing the credit to expire affect the market?

A drop in local building permit applications in September offered a glimpse of what a creditless future could look like. Permits tripled in Chatham County during the summer months as builders began construction on homes that could be completed in time to be bought and occupied ahead of the Nov. 30 tax credit deadline.

Permit numbers dropped drastically in August and September, a trend the head of the local homebuilders association, Matthew Young, said reflected the industry’s wait-and-see approach to the post-tax credit market.

"If they don’t extend" the credit, Young said, "they will wait and see what sales are like after that."

Here’s a great chart from Business Insider that shows how this credit has skewed the market in favor of first time homebuyers:

 So how critical is the home buyer tax credit?

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Doom Transcripts: Index & Guide

Housing Doom is pleased to present a sixth selection from our under-construction transcript of the American Enterprise Institute’s October 22, 2009 event "The Deflating Bubble, Part VI: The Lessons of the Bubble and Crisis".¹

The event site has a number of resources, including an audio and video of the proceedings. There is as yet no official transcript.

This is the presentation by AEI’s Desmond Lachman.

Desmond Lachman: [1:08:20] Alex, thank-you very much again for organizing this conference at a 6-monthly interval.

I think one’s got to go through life counting one’s blessings, and one of the blessings that I’ve realized that I’ve got to count on now is that my name isn’t Tom Zimmerman, and that I come at the end of the presentation.

Because much of what is said, I really agree with. So I can walk through a presentation. I’ve entitled it "A False Dawn for the Housing Market?" [slide 1²]

In the interests of being optimistic I’ve put a question mark whereas I really meant putting an exclamation mark. [laughter]

Let me start just with the lessons that one can draw from this crisis, and I think that there are a whole bunch of lessons. We’re going to be writing books about this for many years to come, much like The Great Depression we’ll be looking through this crisis. And I very much agree with what both Nouriel and John have said, that one really needs to be paying attention to bubbles, that we’re just creating another bubble that is going to be bursting. But I think that there are just a whole bunch of other lessons to be learned.

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